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Gaining Appellate Review by
"Manufacturing"A Final
Judgment Through Voluntary
Dismissal of Peripheral Claims
Rebecca A. Cochran*
"I can never get the Seventh Circuit to take an interlocutory appeal."1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the paths from federal district courts to the federal
circuit courts of appeals have narrowed considerably. Appeals through
rule 54(b), 2 section 1292(b), 3 the collateral order doctrine,4 and other

* Assistant Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. The Colorado College (B.A.,
1974); Northwestern University (M.A., 1975); John Marshall School of Law (J.D., 1984).
The author wishes to thank Julie A. Bauer, Thomas Ferguson, and James R. Guthrie.
Work on this article was funded by a research grant from the University of Dayton School
of Law,
1. Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1438 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting
district court judge Nicolas Bua of the Northern District of Illinois).
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides for entry of judgment upon multiple
claims or involving multiple parties:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all of the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all of the parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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avenues have become increasingly limited, compelling district court
litigants and judges to test the limits of the most prevalent appellate
path-appeal from a final judgment. This Article argues that the
purposes of the final judgment rule, including judicial economy, are
served, not hindered, by voluntary dismissals with prejudice of
peripheral claims to render final an earlier ruling that decided the heart
of the litigation.'
First, this Article profiles the district court cases in which peripheral
claims dismissals typically occur. Then, the Article offers the contradictory appellate court responses to this dismissal practice.
The Article next contends that this controversial dismissal practice
presents further evidence of ways in which the final judgment rule6 has
been shaped by a caseload "crisis in volume" at both the trial and
appellate levels.7 This volume has given rise to trial and appellate

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994) provides:
When a district court judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate determination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing such
order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay the
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals
or a judge thereof shall so order.
4. The collateral order doctrine, first articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), established a limited, judicially-created exception to the final
judgment rule. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text for further discussion.
5. The practice of voluntarily dismissing some claims to make final an earlier decision
does not have a distinct label. The term "peripheral claim" is coined and used here to
indicate that after a partial summary judgment or dismissal ruling on a claim or several
claims in a complaint has been rendered, the remaining or "peripheral" claims may be
judged as meriting voluntary dismissal to allow an appellate review of the already
adjudicated claims in the litigation. Peripheral claims are not frivolous or unimportant;
they have simply assumed a different status after the district court has ruled on other
claims in the litigation. Thus, "[a] party who loses on a dispositive issue that affects only
a portion of his claims may elect to abandon the unaffected [peripheral] claims, invite a
final judgment, and thereby secure review of the adverse ruling." Atlanta Shipping Corp.
v. Chemical Bank, 818 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1987).
6. The final judgment rule is most readily defined as the doctrine now embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1988): "The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts .... " See also Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366
(3rd Cir, 1976).
7. The crisis in volume in the appellate court caseload is described and documented in
DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME,

5-7 (1974) (as the 1960s began, "appellate courts in the United States, federal and state,
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court case management techniques, designed to resolve cases before trial
and to resolve appeals before briefing or oral argument.8 Trial courts
have encouraged settlement by giving more autonomy to litigants to
resolve their disputes and end the litigation, but some appellate courts
find this trend goes too far when it includes concerted, deliberate efforts
to create a final judgment. The growing reluctance of appellate courts to
exercise their discretion in accepting rule 54(b), section 1292(b) and
other discretionary appeals is analyzed as a case management mechanism.
The Article next focuses upon appellate courts' current response to the
largest volume of appeals-final judgment orders under section 1291.
The purposes and goals underlying the final judgment rule, including
the goal of appellate case management, are reviewed. The present
circuit conflict over the finality of voluntary dismissal of peripheral
claims is analyzed within the framework of the crisis of volume and the
judicial responses to overcrowded dockets. In particular, the trial and
appellate courts' practice of overlooking or discounting language of
dismissal with or without prejudice and examining instead the record to
search for the litigants' and trial judges' intent is analyzed and found
unwise, wasteful, and confusing.9 The Article concludes that voluntary
dismissal of peripheral claims, with prejudice, is an approach that
advances, rather than subverts, the underlying purposes of the final
judgment rule and ultimately supports the case management goals of
trial and appellate courts. Some recent decisions, in which finality has
been achieved through dismissal with prejudice of peripheral claims,
wrongly deny appellate jurisdiction. Other decisions too readily accept
appeals when peripheral claims are dismissed without prejudice, thereby
undermining the final judgment rule by creating opportunities for

were ... inadequately equipped to cope with the torrent of appeals which lay ahead.");
Thomas B. Marvell, Is There an Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?, 24 JUDGES' J. 34
(Spring 1985) (appeals have "increased rapidly-much faster than trial court caseloads, the
number of judgeships, or any other factor one might associate with appellate volume.");
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, 110 (1990) ("However people may

view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its appellate courts are in a 'crisis
of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions they were even a generation
ago.").
8. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text analyzing case management techniques
in trial and appellate courts.
9. Compare United States v. Kaufman, 985 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
appellate jurisdiction where record reveals no intent to manipulate appellate process) and
Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1433 (finding no appellate jurisdiction where parties intended to
"force a decision" from appellate court) with Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d
621, 624 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding trial judge's "intent" to create a final appealable order to
be irrelevant).
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piecemeal appeals. This approach advances a return to honoring the
formalities of language. The dismissal order's language is viewed as a
material condition of the relationship between the trial and appellate
courts, rather than as a routine or empty formality. Reliance on the
formal language, rather than a search of the trial court record for good
or bad intent, will create a clear path to an appeal, as well as save time,
curb frustration, and conserve judicial resources. Basing appellate
jurisdiction on intent, rather than on the designation of dismissal with
or without prejudice, weakens the final judgment rule and wastes muchneeded judicial resources.
A. District Court Use of Voluntary Dismissal of PeripheralClaims to
Achieve Finality
District court litigants and district court judges have manufactured or
created appealable final orders by using or recommending voluntary
dismissal of peripheral claims in district court litigation after the central
or core claim or claims in the case have been dismissed or resolved in a
summary judgment order." The voluntary dismissal' with prejudice
of remaining claims and counterclaims, which both parties may deem not
worth pursuing, should render the earlier order dispositive, final, and
appealable.
Often district court litigants have found significant portions of their
cases are resolved by a district court's grant of a motion for summary

10. See, e.g., Chengv. Commissionerof IRS, 878 F.2d 306,311(9th Cir. 1989)(appellate
court suggesting to appellant that he may avoid "finality problem by simply dismissing his

remaining claim and defenses without the option to pursue them should this court
reverse"); Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 834,837 (2d Cir. 1986) (jurisdictional defect cured
when appellant withdrew counterclaim after appellate oral argument); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1986) (order may become final "when that
portion of the case that remained in the district court has subsequently been terminated"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822, 823 (1987). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914 (a final judgment may be "manufactured" by
dismissing all of the remaining claims).
11. Voluntary dismissal is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. The
voluntary dismissal at issue in these cases frequently falls under rule 41(a)(2).
FED. R. Clv. P. 41(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the
defendant of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
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judgment or dismissal on several counts of a claim. 12 Such decisions
resolve the gist of the litigants' action, rendering unnecessary extensive
and expensive trials."3 Experience may have taught counsel that their
court of appeals reluctantly accepts interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b),14 and rule 54(b) may also be unavailable because the
remaining open counts may be tangentially related to claims already
resolved."5 Entering a consent judgment or a stipulated dismissal order
on the claim the district court has already determined may also result
in loss of that claim's appealability."
Suffering an involuntary
dismissal on remaining claims could be a valid route to appeal, 7 but
some courts have closed that option also.'8

12.

Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1432 (trial court granted summary judgment motions and

dismissed Counts I (civil RICO), II (breach of contract), III (constructive trust), IV
(resulting trust), "leaving only Counts V-VII [trademark infringement, unfair competition,
and unfair/deceptive trade practices] and defendants' counterclaim pending for trial"). See
infra notes 188-90.
13. Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1438 ("[No, it doesn't make economic sense to try the balance
of the case."); Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1172 (7th Cir. 1994) (concurring)
(supporting use of dismissal with leave to reinstate to conserve district court's time and
efforts because their "scarce resources" are "already overextended" they should not "expend
even more time on cases that are going nowhere"). The time and expense currently
involved in taking cases to trial in district court is well documented. Ordinary. as opposed
to big or complex, litigation in the district court simply takes longer than it once did. The
number of civil trials is up, and the average length of trials has increased. See Michael
Solimine, Revitalizing InterlocutoryAppeals in the FederalCourts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1165, 1195 (1990) (explaining that current, "ordinary" district court litigation now tends
to last longer when cases do go to trial); Judith Resnick, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory
Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 556 (1986) (analyzing trial length in data
collected from 1945-1984).
14. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1166-67 (describing appellate courts as an "apparently
hostile climate" for interlocutory appeals under either 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or the "collateral
order" doctrine).
15. See, e.g., Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1433 (describing district court judge as dissatisfied
with the "inhospitable attitude of this circuit to interlocutory appeals" under either rule
54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
16. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 607 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam) (disallowing appeal of consent judgment even when right of appeal was
expressly reserved), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 924 (1980); Jones v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 840 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that stipulated dismissal order
encompassed "all claims that were or could have been raised"; party lost chance to appeal
earlier court orders dismissing claims as barred or preempted).
17. Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1438 ("The only alternative is to suffer a dismissal and appeal
from [the] order."). See generally 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET.AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

1 41.11[2] at 41-147 (1995) (involuntary dismissal is a final, appealable judgment).
18. See Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 458
U.S. 1106 (1982); Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 919 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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Recognizing and responding to the limited availability of appeals, 9
litigants and trial judges have forged a new avenue for appeal that uses
section 1291 and its mandatory right of appeal from a final judgment.
Litigants and trial judges are highly motivated to seek a final judgment
and appellate review of an earlier dispositive order because all agree the
case is essentially concluded, save for the shouting and posturing. They
may agree to amend allegations in the complaint or voluntarily dismiss
20
the remaining counts of the complaint or a counterclaim still pending.
The voluntary dismissal is often without prejudice, sometimes with
prejudice. With these peripheral claims resolved, the judges and
litigants view the earlier summary judgment or dismissal
order as a
1
final judgment and the parties appeal that final decision.'
B.

Appellate Court Response to Voluntary Dismissals
The district courts' use of voluntary dismissals to tie up the loose ends
of litigation and thus appeal an earlier adjudication as a final decision
has, however, split the circuit courts 22 and divided three circuits within
themselves.23 Splits arise over whether the appealability of the earlier

19. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1166 & n.6 ("(Of course, the availability of such
[appellate] review influences litigant and judicial behavior at the trial level.").
20. See, e.g., National Broilers Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 819 n.5
(1977) ("to facilitate appeal" after grant of partial summary judgment, Government
amended complaint without prejudice to any later renewal of allegations abandoned by the
amendment).
21. Note that the appeal sought is from the central, adversely adjudicated claim, not
the voluntarily dismissed peripheral claim. A party may voluntarily dismiss a claim, but
may not then appeal the voluntarily dismissed claim because he has not suffered an
adverse adjudication from the court on that claim. See generally 5 JAMES W. MOORE, ET.
AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.02[6] at 41-41 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Seidman v. City
of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff could not appeal after
voluntary dismissal of claim because such dismissal was not an adverse judgment)).
22. CompareChappelle v. Beacon Communications, Inc., 84 F.3d 652,653 (2d Cir. 1996)
(precluding appeal of plaintiff's adjudicated claims when remaining, peripheral claims were
dismissed without prejudice); Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1078
(9th Cir. 1994) (same); Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th
Cir. 1992) (same); Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298,302-03 (5th Cir. 1978)
(denying appeal and finding voluntary dismissal without prejudice of peripheral claims
could not make adjudicated claims appealable) with Hicks v. NLO, Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120
(6th Cir. 1987) (allowing appeal of adjudicated claims when peripheral claims were
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice); Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150,
1155 (3rd Cir. 1986) (allowing appeal when remaining peripheral claims had been
"voluntarily and finally abandoned"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987).
23. The issue has split the Seventh Circuit: compare Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1435-36
(finding no final judgment when parties stipulated dismissal without prejudice of
peripheral claims and appealed earlier partial summary judgment decision) with Division
241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 & n.1 (7th Cir.) (allowing
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adjudicated claim "turns upon.., the dismissal of the remaining claims
with prejudice."2 4 Splits and intracircuit inconsistencies leave district
court litigants and judges frustrated and uncertain about which
procedure will satisfy the appellate courts and permit an appeal to go
forward. One court of appeals accepts the appeal, finding a final
judgment resulted from a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.2" Or,
the court of appeals dismisses the appeal for lack of a final judgment
because the voluntary dismissal was without prejudice.26 Or the court
of appeals accepts the appeal because it has previously instructed the
litigants to return to the district court, voluntarily dismiss the outstanding claims, and then return once the judgment is made final.27
Thus, the appellate courts variously characterize the dismissal practice
as unacceptable-the parties exhibit a bad intent to manipulate the
judicial system to gain appellate review--or as an acceptable alternative
that they suggest to trial court litigants seeking a final, appealable
judgment. Appellate courts discount the language of the dismissal
orders and instead expend scarce judicial resources scrutinizing trial
records for evidence of the parties and the district court judges' good or
bad intent in creating a final judgment through this voluntary dismissal
practice.

appeal following voluntary dismissal without prejudice of peripheral claims), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1029 (1976) with United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir.)
(allowing appeal when peripheral claims dismissed without prejudice, but when no
evidence parties or judge intended to "create" appellate jurisdiction), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
913 (1993); the Eighth Circuit: compare DuBose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.
1990) (dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute did not make earlier adverse
adjudication appealable) with Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., 939 F.2d 538 (8th
Cir. 1991)(finding final judgment when parties stipulated dismissal without prejudice of
peripheral claims, thus making the earlier judgment granting partial summary judgment
a final judgment for appeal although no rule 54(b) certification issued); and the Eleventh
Circuit: compare Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1995) (denying
appeal when peripheral claims voluntarily dismissed without prejudice) with Studstill v,
Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d 1005, 1007-08 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (allowing
appeal of adjudicated claims when peripheral claims dismissed without prejudice).
24. Chappelle, 84 F.3d at 654.
25. Chrysler, 939 F.2d at 540.
26. Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at 1075 (concluding that a stipulation to dismiss did not
"finalize" previous summary judgment order).
27. United States v. Kaufmann, 951 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1992) (advising parties to
return to district court and dismiss remaining indictments); Kaufmann, 985 F.2d at 890
(finding appellate jurisdiction because no intent by parties to manipulate judicial appellate
process).
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FINALITY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO A CRISIS OF VOLUME

Some observers believe that an overload of cases at the trial and
appellate level shaped, and continues to shape, nearly every aspect of
federal practice in the 1980s and the 1990s.2" Numbers of trial court
filings and appeals reveal part of the story.2 9 The size of the cases
entering the system, such as environmental mass torts or civil RICO
claims with multiple parties, multiple claims, massive discovery, and
expert testimony, also plays a role in this crisis.3 0 Judges openly
express their frustration over a perceived caseload crisis; regardless of
the substantive issue before the court, a judge may use the occasion to
comment on a crowded docket.3 Some judges may publicly urge that
new limits be placed on federal jurisdiction at both the trial and
appellate levels.32 Others question the perceived crisis of volume,
debating its severity and its effects upon judges and the judicial
system.3"

Whether the size of the increase in their caseloads may be quantified
precisely or not, at least some portion of the trial and appellate judiciary
has perceived and responded to a crisis in case volume and individual
28. DANIEL J. MEADOR, MAURICE ROSENBURG,& PAUL D. CARRINGTON, APPELLATE
COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL, 329 (1994) ("A study of
appellate institutions apart from the volume problem would be wholly unrealistic. Indeed,
much of what currently goes on in appellate courts can be understood only in relation to
the growth in the number of appeals.").
29. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (1993) (chart depicting growth in number of appeals filed
in the United States Courts of Appeals from 1892-1992, showing very rapid increases from
1977-1992).
30. See, e.g., In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976)
("The explosion of litigation in the past two decades in terms of both the number of filings
and the complexity and scope of many of those cases has led thoughtful minds to wonder
whether the judicial system as we now know it can cope with some of these cases.").
31. See, e.g., EDC, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 915 F.2d 1082, 1084 (7th Cir. 1990)
(referring to counsel's manipulation of brief pages limits, "Game-playing wastes the time
of this court, time increasingly scarce as our docket grows at a rate exceeding 10% each
year.").
32. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the
Federal Courts, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (Jan. 1993) (explaining that case volume undercuts
judicial goal of giving cases individual attention that they warrant and undercuts efforts
to maintain the "quality of justice" in the federal courts of appeals); Paul Marcotte,
Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction,75 A.B.A. J. 22-23 (April 1989) (summarizing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's suggestions for limiting federal jurisdiction).
33. Michael C. Gizzi, Examining the Crisis of Volume in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 96 (1993) (questioning lack of empirical evidence to support the
alleged "crisis of volume" after survey revealed that federal appellate judges reported their
workload was not overwhelming).
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case size. Judges, legislators, and litigants have developed and proposed
a wide range of procedural rules, techniques, and methods to address
large caseloads and delays in the judicial process. The responses at both
levels have produced a federal court system tending to encourage
independence in litigants and judges to resolve disputes either before
trial or on appeal, to produce less written work product, and to limit
jurisdiction by screening for jurisdiction defects.
These responses have laid the foundation for and contributed to the
current controversy over voluntary dismissals of peripheral claims to
achieve a final appealable decision. Case volume and judicial responses
to volume have engendered a certain mistrust between the courts on
issues concerning finality. Appellate courts express concern that trial
courts certify appeals perhaps too readily or promote voluntary
dismissals to move cases off their dockets.34 Trial courts express
frustration that appellate courts have narrowed their jurisdiction to
protect their own workloads.35 In addition, the sheer volume and size
of the cases at both levels may contribute to an indifference as to
whether a voluntary dismissal order is entered with prejudice or without
prejudice. In the rush to resolve cases quickly at the trial level or in the
appellate screening process, the status of each claim in large litigation
and the nature of its dismissal or resolution may be overlooked or
remain unanalyzed.
A.

Finalityand DistrictCourt Case Management Practices

At the trial court level, the growing caseload has fostered independence of the parties and encouraged experiments by litigants and district
court judges to manage and settle cases in new ways. Increasingly,
parties work together, without court involvement, to manage the course
of litigation in the district court. The parties' willingness to use
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), to innovate and negotiate, has
gained judicial interest and generated hope that such practices will
reduce the trial court dockets and, in turn, appellate court dockets.36
Efforts to conserve judicial resources are evident, for example, in the
1993 amendments to the federal civil discovery rules, which may require

34. See infra notes 65-67, 148-50.

35. See supra notes 3, 18.
36. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1180 (district court focus on ADR methods reflects
"belief that ADR will reduce the large backlog of cases facing trial and appellate courts.");
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 297, 302

(1996) (finding ADR has been embraced by the judiciary, but now "requires additional
experimentation, learning, and selection of the appropriate court reaction to different forms
of ADR").
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litigants to exchange information and to make potentially crucial
disclosures without any court supervision and which may also require
written certification of their efforts to resolve problems before scarce
judicial resources will be used to resolve them." More recently, parties
almost gained the power to stipulate to protective orders without the
court having to find good cause to enter the protective order.38
While district court litigants and judges have worked to create new
ways of fostering settlement and streamlining litigation, some appellate
court judges have expressed concern that trial judges have become
overzealous in their settlement and docket control efforts. They fear
that trial judges have delegated tasks to others or abdicated their proper
judicial roles by permitting parties to develop new methods of resolving
their own disputes. For example, trial court ADR techniques have
expanded to such an extent that one appellate court expressed concern
that a district court magistrate judge had improperly turned arbitrator
to help the parties resolve their dispute. 9

37. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a), (b) (requiring exchange of basic, relevant information without
a formal request or court order); FED. R. CIv. P. 37(a)(2Xb) (requiring party moving to
compel disclosure to "include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to
secure the information or material without court action")
38. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently allow parties to stipulate to
discovery procedures, FED. R. Civ. P. 28, including the entry of protective orders, FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c), but only upon a finding by the court that the protective order is entered "for
good cause shown."
In March 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States rejected a proposal that
would have allowed judges to enter the parties' stipulated protective orders without first
showing good cause. The Conference concluded the proposed rule would "not serve the
public interest." Henry J. Reske, Orders in the Court, 81 A.B.A. J. 28 (May 1995).
39. DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163
(7th Cir. 1994). The district court proceedings are viewed as the product of the parties'
"brainstorm." The opinion also notes, with some concern, the efforts of the parties to
modify, and often shorten, the course of litigation. Id. at 1166.
Parties are free within broad limits to agree on simplified procedures for the
decisions of their case .... They can, of course, agree to binding arbitration,
albeit before an arbitrator rather than a judge.
...[I]fjudges ... could double as arbitrators, Judge Aspen, say, might issue an
arbitration award and the winner might take it to Judge Zagel for an order of
confirmation. It's an ingenious idea and since "alternative dispute resolution" is
all the rage these days-... the day may not be distant when federal judges will
be recommissioned ... as arbitrators. But it has not arrived.
Id. See also Richard A. Posner, Copingwith the Caseload: A Comment on Magistratesand
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2215, 2216 (1989) (discussing appellate view of district court
delegation of tasks to special masters and magistrates in response to trial court caseload);
Stempel, supra note 36, at 302 ("Without a doubt, ADR has ridden a crest of popularity
that at times resembles a fad.").
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This same appellate court concern that trial judges and litigants have
gone too far in their brainstorming efforts to solve an overloaded docket
extends to the practice of voluntary dismissal of peripheral claims to
gain appellate review of adjudicated claims. When a meeting between
the trial judge and the parties focused on creating a final judgment from
voluntary dismissal of peripheral claims as the only remaining route to
appeal open, the appellate court was offended. It found the conference
sounded like the "meeting of a committee to reform the Civil Rules.
That committee came up with a practical solution agreeable to all ....
We need to examine this attempted de facto revision of the Civil
Rules.'
A proliferating district court docket has spurred additional efficiency
measures, including use of special masters and magistrates,4 1 summary
jury trials,4 2 and a move to favor rulings from the bench, rather than
District court bench rulings may contribute to
written opinions.'
mistrust or miscommunication between the courts because the loss of a
written opinion may weaken the ability of the appellate court to judge
the factual and procedural record of the case below. When written
opinions are issued, the appellate court, as well as the litigants, may

40. Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1432-33.
41. Magistrates are authorized to perform a range of district court tasks. Their
appointment and duties are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988).
42. See generally S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829
(1986); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 103 F.R.D.
461 (1984).
Whether participation in summary jury trials and other dispute resolution methods can
be compelled has been the subject of debate. CompareIn re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir.
1993) (holding participation in summary jury trial cannot be compelled) with Montgomery
v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 469 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding that 1993
amended F.R.C.P. 16, in conjunction with local rule, gives court "authority to order the
parties in a civil action to participate in a summary jury trial, notwithstanding the
objection of a party," and finding NLO case involved pre-1993 Rule 16). See generally
Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participationin Innovative PretrialProceedings,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 290 (1989).
43. For example, the Northern District of Illinois recently circulated a proposed local
rule that judges "rule orally whenever possible." The lower court opinions, therefore, would
be available only through the transcriptions counsel obtain from the district court's court
reporter. Such rulings from the bench do not create unpublished opinions to be picked up
and distributed by Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis for on-line access. As a result, precedent that
had been "inflated" by the rise of database services, particularly district court opinions,
may be less inflated in the future. See Susan Brenner, PRECEDENT INFLATION 265 (1991)
(studying the effects of putting "unpublished" opinions on-line, inflating precedent, and
resulting in a "paradigm shift" into a "quantitative conception of precedent").
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receive a fuller sense of the law, facts, and the district court's view of the
case before it.""

B. Finality and Appellate Case Management Practices
Although the existence and extent of the crisis in volume continues to
be debated, appellate courts, like trial courts, have implemented case
management methods to help move an increasing appellate docket.
Appellate courts have adopted no publication rules,45 limited oral
argument," delegated tasks to clerks and staff,47 gained additional

44. The loss of a written opinion or the use of unpublished opinions has also been a
concern at the appellate level. See infra note 51.
45. See, e.g., Fifth Cir. Ct. Rule 21. See generally Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation
of Limited Publicationin the United States Courts of Appeals, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573
(1981); Nichols, Selective Publicationof Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909
(1986).
46. See, e.g., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docketing Statement
VI: "Indicate Whether Oral Argument Is Desired In This Appeal. If So, Why In Your
Opinion Should Argument Be Heard?" See also WIS. APP. R. 809.19 (requiring appellant's
brief to contain a statement with reasons as to whether oral argument is necessary);
Fourth Circuit Rule 34(a) ("In furtherance of the disposition of pending cases under this
rule, any party may include in his brief at the conclusion of the argument, a statement
setting forth the reasons why, in his opinion, oral argument should be heard.").
Appellate judges express mixed opinions about the persuasive value of oral argument.
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Responsibility and Professional
Competence, 11 CAP. U. L. REv. 445, 456 (1982) (arguing that in 95% of appellate cases,
written briefs are the basis for the court's decision). But see Myran H. Bright & Richard
S. Arnold, OralArgument? It May Be Crucial!, 70 A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (Sept. 1984) (offering
a judge's statistics showing that oral argument changed his opinion about the outcome of
the case in 51% of 139 cases heard during ten months).
47. Central staff attorneys are law clerks or assistants who serve the courts as a whole,
rather than individual judges. Central staff attorneys perform a range of functions for
state and federal appellate courts, including case management and settlement programs.
See Ubell, Report on CentralStaff Attorneys' Offices in the United States Court ofAppeals,
87 F.R.D. 253 (1980).
Appellate judges also delegate certain tasks to their own judicial clerks, which has
caused some commentators to suggest that judicial clerks may sometimes serve as "de
facto"judges. J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: ForBetter or Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
321 (1988).
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appellate judges,4" and used district court judges to sit by designation
on appellate panels.49
As in the district courts, appellate court opinions may be rendered
verbally from the bench to save the time and resources required to
generate a written opinion. This fast track appellate process results in
no written opinion. 50 When parties select the fast track, briefs are filed
and the case is moved forward on the docket. The court may permit oral
argument, pose questions, and then issue a ruling from the bench
without a written opinion. The process eliminates a written opinion;
thus, like the bench ruling below in the district courts, "the chief
disadvantage is the lost opinion."51 The loss of a written appellate
opinion, or even unpublished opinions, may contribute to miscommunication or mistrust between the appellate and trial courts, evident in the
current split over using voluntary dismissals to achieve appellate
jurisdiction.5 2
Additional appellate case management methods include settlement on
appeal programs and CAMP programs. Some of these methods have,
however, created derivative problems, in part because of the delegation
of duties to court staff. When duties are delegated to staff attorneys and
others, the tracking system itself may create confusion
and inconsisten3
cies in the granting of appellate jurisdiction.

48. Appointing additional appellate judges has some potential for resolving part of the
volume in appeals. Reinhardt, supra note 33, at 53 (proposing that "Congress double the
size of the courts of appeals"). But see Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79
A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (July 1993). Additional judges, however, may create greater potential for
splits among the circuits. Thus, judicial resources may be spent resolving conflicts among
the circuit courts of appeals. Thomas E. Baker, ProposedIntramuralReforms: What the
U.S. Courts of Appeals Might Do To Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 1321 (1994).
Contra Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PrrT. L. REV. 693 (1995) (concluding "that unresolved
intercircuit conflicts do not constitute a problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial
system").
49. Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An
Examinationof the Use ofDistrictCourt Judges Sitting by Designationon the United States
Courtsof Appeals, 28 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 351, 357 (1995).
50. See, e.g., D.C. Cir. R. 14(c).
51. Baker, supra note 48, at 1336. Not surprisingly, the fast track/no written opinion
option is not always popular with litigants. Ruth B. Ginsberg, The Obligation to Reason
Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 205, 221 (1985).
52. See, e.g., Kaufmann, 985 F.2d at 887 (jurisdictional finality issue determined in
unpublished order).
53. See, e.g., Dannenberg,16 F.3d at 1047 n.1 (previous motions panel had found there
was appellate jurisdiction, but court concludes there is none).
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NARROWING DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO LIMIT
VOLUME

Case volume and judicial responses to case volume contribute to the
current controversy over voluntary dismissal of peripheral claims to
appeal a previously adjudicated central claim or claims. In the face of
high volume, appellate courts may exercise discretion and narrow
interpretations to limit the number of cases coming under appellate
review. Outside the final judgment appeal of right under section 1291,
discretionary appellate review may be available through either rule 54(b)
or section 1292(b). Both of these avenues give trial court judges the
discretion to enter and certify the orders to the court of appeals, rather
than awaiting a final judgment order in the litigation. The appellate
courts may exercise discretion to accept or reject the certification order.
Appellate judges indicate an increasing reluctance to accept these
appeals, thereby decreasing the volume of appeals."
Potential avenues of appeal under judicially-created interlocutory
appeals, the collateral order doctrine, and the Gillespie test are
infrequently available; moreover, they are not likely to be used any more
frequently in the future."
A.

Limiting Rule 54(b) Appeals

Rule 54(b) certification permits district court judges to create a final
appealable order, but only for separable parties and claims.56 The rule
recognizes that the single judicial unit has evolved into multiple judicial
units and permits judges to enter a final judgment for individual claims
in cases with multiple claims, multiple parties, or both. Rule 54(b) does

54. But see Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1433 (district court's decision to enter judgment under
rule 54(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but district court "discretion carefully
exercised is rarely upset.").
55. Not addressed here are the extraordinary routes to appeal available under
mandamus, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988), reviews of decisions granting or denying injunctions,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1988); or a judicially-created exception under Forgay v. Conrad, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848) (exception for orders directing the immediate delivery or
possession of property). These routes are employed in limited circumstances. The appeals
analyzed here, however, have been more available in the past and are now more limited.
56. Rule 54(b) was designed to protect litigants whose claims are finally determined
early in the course of a complex and protracted case. Randall J. Turk, Note, Toward a
More Rational FinalJudgment Rule: A Proposalto Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292,67 GEo. L.J.
1025, 1030 (1979). Technically, Rule 54(b) orders are final, not interlocutory, but simply
final as to a single party or a single claim.
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not avoid the final judgment rule; rather, the ruling involved must be
otherwise final under section 1291 to be eligible for a rule 54(b) order.5 7
Under rule 54(b), appellate courts review district courts' certification
under an abuse of discretion standard.5" Appellate courts prefer that
the district court exercise its discretion clearly by articulating the
reasons supporting a rule 54(b) certification. 9 Some appellate courts'
local rules expressly require such articulation.'
Although the stated standard of review is abuse of discretion,
appellate courts are reluctant to accept rule 54(b) appeals.6 1 The
appellate courts read rule 54(b) requirements strictly: certification for
appeal should be made only as a remedy in "the infrequent harsh
case. 2 Rule 54(b) is an exception to section 1291 finality, and an
appeal under rule 54(b) is permitted "relatively rarely." 3
The appellate denial of jurisdiction following rule 54(b) certification
orders often focuses upon improper collaboration between judge and
parties, a practice appellate courts also fear in the context of voluntary
dismissal of peripheral claims. In the context of rule 54(b) orders,
appellate courts question a trial court judge's willingness to readily
approve an order drafted by the parties. Certification "should not be
entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel.'
Abuse of discretion is found and appellate review denied when the judge
"rubber stamps" the parties' requested certification. 5 When "it

57. Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
58. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8, 10-11 (1980) (district
court's decision to certify under rule 54(b) should not be overturned unless clearly

unreasonable).
59. See, e.g., Horn v. Transcon Lines, 898 F.2d 589, 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1990) ("When a
district court judge does not support a decision [to certify under rule 54(b)] an appellate
court should be skeptical."); Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th
Cir. 1988) (cannot defer where district court recites words of rule without supporting
reasons for rule 54(b) certification).

60. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Local Rule 23 (cited in
Anthius v. Colt Ind. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1003 (3rd Cir. 1992)).
61. But see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 367 (3d Cir.
1975) (Gibbons, J. dissenting).

Rule 54(b) does not give this [appellate] court authority to decline to hear an
appeal from final decisions disposing of separate claims and those interlocutory
appeals of nonfinal orders. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) we may decline to hear an
interlocutory appeal. The majority would prefer that we have the same power

under Rule 54(b) and has devised an improper construction of the rule to achieve
that result.
62. Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 362.
63. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1167 n.10.
64. Allis.Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 363.
65. See, e.g., Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1434.
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appeared from the record that the district court had reflexively signed
the Rule 54(b) order" that the parties drafted and presented, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals denied appellate review.'

B. Limiting Section 1292(b) Interlocutory Appeals
The district court may also certify an interlocutory order, under
section 1292(b), containing: (1) a controlling question of law, (2)
substantially arguable, and (3) that may materially advance the
litigation.6 7 The appeal must materially advance the litigation,
resulting in savings of litigants' and courts' time and expense. The
substantial ground for difference depends on the trial court's estimation
of the probability of reversal of the order in light of the circuit's law.
Interlocutory appeals prevent injustice as a result of the final judgment
rule. Without such avenues of appeal, certain interlocutory orders are
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final decision.
The appellate court "can then accept or reject the [section 1292(b)]
appeal at its discretion."" Thus, a section 1292(b) review does not
defer at all to the district court, giving the appellate court much more
control than the abuse of discretion standard used in a rule 54(b)
70
review.69 The statute requires the district court to certify the order,
but the appellate court accepts the appeal "in its discretion."71 The
review of a section 1292(b) order requires no "review of or deference to

66. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1238 (7th Cir. 1990), amended, clarified,
Nos. 89-2441, 89-2899, 89-2900, 1990 WL 192085, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 487 (7th Cir.),

cert. granted & vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 801 (1991).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988); FED. R. APP. P. 5. The Supreme Court may now
promulgate rules regarding the categories of interlocutory appeals available. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(e), "[t]he Supreme Court 'may prescribe rules, in accordance with section
2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."
The new provision of the statute acknowledges the very limited nature of interlocutory
appeals and gives the Supreme Court the power to add new types of nonfinal orders to the
list in section 1292. "The list of the appealable interlocutory determinations is in § 1292,
and it's a small one." David D. Siegal, Commentary on 1988 and 1992 Amendments, 28
U.S.C. § 1292, at 335. See generally Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and
Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717
(1993).

68. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1166-67.
69. See generally STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW, TRIAL JUDGE: SUPERVISION AND DISCRETION § 4.11, 4-75 to 4-79 (2d ed. 1992).
70. As with the rule 54(b) certification, some appellate courts prefer that the section
1292(b) order include the district court's reasons for issuing the certification. See, e.g., Isa
Fruit Co. v. Agrexico Agric. Export Co., 804 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1986).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). See also Martineau, supra note 68, at 731 ("A court of
appeals.., has absolute discretion to refuse to hear the appeal.").
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the judge's decision to certify an order, since at that point the issue is
one of appellate choice .... "7' Thus, "[s]ection 1292(b) is seldom a
successful route to an interlocutory appeal."v
With the increase in volume, the appellate courts have become even
more reluctant to exercise discretion to receive interlocutory appeals
under section 1292(b). Any factor, including appellate case docket
congestion, may properly play a role in the appellate courts' decision to
accept an appeal. 4 In exercising their discretion, some appellate courts
have narrowed the statute's scope by requiring that the case be large
and exceptional to qualify for section 1292(b) certification.75 In the
section 1292(b) setting, as well as in rule 54(b) cases, appellate courts
also express concern that the district courts "not act routinely" in
certifying such exceptional appeals.76 Thus, "section 1292(b) by its
limited exception
terms" and by the courts' narrow reading, "is the most
77
otherwise."
or
statutory
rule,
judgment
final
to the
C. Limiting Judicially Created InterlocutoryAppeals
In addition to rule 54(b) and section 1292(b), judicially created
interlocutory appeals are technically available, but infrequently
successful. Interlocutory appeals may be permitted under the collateral
order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp. 7 which was

72.

CHILDRESS & DAvis, supra note 69, at 4-77.

73. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1167-68 (gathering statistics revealing "how few
certified appeals are accepted by the circuit courts"); John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy
Quilt of InterlocutoryAppeals Jurisprudencewith DiscretionaryReview, 44 DuKE L.J. 200,
nn.133-135 (1994) (between 1985 and 1989, 1,411 appeals were certified by district courts
and 504 were accepted).
74. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,475 (1978) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
court may deny appellate jurisdiction for any reason, including congestion); Milbert v.
Bison Lab., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958) (exception "not intended to open the
floodgates to a vast number of appeals... in ordinary litigation").
75. John C. Nagel, supra note 73, at 212 n. 97; Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433 (this exception
to be used only in the "exceptional case"); Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 364 F.2d
919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1959); Solimine,
supra note 14, at 1167 ("[Sjome federal courts have purported to limit the use of section
1292(b) to 'big cases,'and in fact, relatively few appeals are certified at the district court
level or accepted by the circuit courts.").
With such an array of factors at hand in the realm of interlocutory appeals, proposals
for reform of interlocutory appeals include creating new interlocutory categories or giving
the appellate court discretion and factors to guide them in allowing interlocutory appeals.
See generally Martineau, supra note 67, at 748-768.
76. Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433.
77. Martineau, supra note 67, at 731.
78. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The case defined the four characteristics of an order, which
when all are present, make an order effectively final and suitable for interlocutory appeal.
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restated in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay9 to require that a collateral
order may be appealable when: 1) it conclusively determines the
disputed question; 2) it resolves an important issue; 3) it is completely
separate from the merits of the action; and 4) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."0 The doctrine remains viable,
and the Supreme Court uses the doctrine,8 but "it is fair to say that
2
collateral orders will not be a rich source of interlocutory appeals. 1
As with other routes to appeal, appeals under the collateral order
doctrine have responded to caseload volume. Initially, appellate courts
used the collateral order doctrine to allow an appeal from an order
disqualifying opposing counsel.8 3 Several circuits followed this practice,
but as the number of appeals based on this type of order increased, the
courts retreated, deciding that this type of order should no longer be
deemed a collateral order requiring appellate court review."
In another judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, the
Supreme Court has formulated a balancing test for interlocutory
appeals, allowing an appeal of an interlocutory order when the costs of
continuing the litigation before an appeal outweighed the costs of
piecemeal review."5 This balancing test, also known as the "practical
(or pragmatic) finality" exception to the final order doctrine," "has

First, the order was not tentative, informal or incomplete. Second, the order was separate
from the merits of the case. Third, the delay of review risked serious irreparable harm to
the defendant. Fourth, the dispute represented a serious and unsettled question.
79. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
80. Id. The collateral order doctrine recognizes the need for finality, but also recognizes
the "worry that an aggrieved party will be denied review entirely." MDK, Inc. v. Mike's
Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 510 (1994).
81. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1207-08 (1995)
(analyzing order denying summary judgment motion and concluding not an appealable
collateral order under Cohen); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798
(1989)(collateral order exception interpreted with "utmost strictness in criminal cases" and
court decisions denying collateral order appeals are "far more numerous" than those
permitting such appeals).
82. Solimine, supra note 13, at 1171 (noting that opinions denying jurisdiction narrowly
construe the doctrine because § 1292(b) is an available alternative route to an appeal).
83. See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1977)
("order denying a motion for disqualification of counsel is final under the collateral order
doctrine of Cohen"), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
84. See, e.g., In re Multipiece Rim Prod. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1980)
(overruling Weber and joining sister circuits to find that order denying a motion for
disqualification of counsel is no longer appealable under the collateral order rule); Melamed
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1979) (overruling previous decisions
and holding that order denying motion for disqualification of counsel is not appealable
under collateral order doctrine).
85. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964).
86. Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (10th Cir. 1995).

1997]

APPELLATE REVIEW

997

lived a checkered life," 7 has been rejected by the commentators, and
often has been avoided by the courts." Thus, the Gillespie test is not
a likely avenue of appeal; it is narrowly interpreted,8 9 and indeed, its
continued viability is in doubt.9
IV

NARROWING FINAL JUDGMENT JURISDICTION TO CONTROL

VOLUME
The most prevalent path to appellate jurisdiction is through an appeal
The appellate
of right from a final decision under section 1291.91
process typically begins when the trial court renders a final decision and
files a separate judgment.92 Some appellate courts use the separate
judgment requirement as a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction-another means of dismissing the appeal for a jurisdictional defect,
thereby limiting the number of appeals. 3 Appellate courts then make

87. Utah State Dep't of Health v. Kenecott Corp., 14 F.3d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 197 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 752 (10th Cir. 1993) (exception
invoked "only in truly unique circumstances"); Joseph Mitzel, Note, When Is an Order
Final?: A Result-OrientedApproach to the Finality Requirement for Bankruptcy Appeals
to Federal CircuitCourts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1345 (1990) (urging courts to interpret
Gillespie narrowly or avoid it altogether).
89. United States v. Garner, 747 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (the "pragmatic finality
approach has been virtually limited to the facts of the Gillespie case, at least in the context
of§ 1291 appeals."). See also Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253, rev'd on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 33 (1980).
90. A recent certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court presents the
question: "Does the non-final order appealability rule enunciated in Gillespie v. United
States Steel Co., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) remain a viable exception to the general rule that
appeals should be limited to final orders as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1291?" Petition for
certiorari filed on April 29, 1996. Chamblee v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (11th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. June 24, 1996) (No. 95-1800).
91. The final judgment rule is incorporated into the federal system through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts.
92. FED. R. CIv. P. 58 requires the district court judge to file judgment as a separate
document at the end of a case: "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document." FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
93. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (st Cir. 1995) (without a final
judgment set out in a separate document, there is no final decision for appellate review
even if the trial court has resolved all claims); Baker v. South Pac. Transp., 542 F.2d 1123
(9th Cir. 1976) (denying appellate jurisdiction for failure to supply separate document of
judgment). Contra W.G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 501
n.4 (4th Cir. 1973) (requirement waived; review of appeal on merits); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 384-88 (1978) (resolving circuit split and allowing waiver where
finality of order and waiver of the separate judgment requirement are both clear on the
record). See generally Michael Zachary, Rules 58 and 79(a) of the FederalRules of Civil
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an independent review of the trial court records to determine if section
1291 jurisdiction exists. 4 The section 1291 review gives none of the
deference deemed present in a rule 54(b) certification review. In
addition, unlike a section 1292(b) certification review, this review has no
listed statutory factors to apply.
Because the majority of cases on the federal appellate courts' dockets
comes from final judgment, rather than interlocutory appeal, this search
of the record below for finality takes on an increased intensity in the
setting of a crisis of volume.9" Indeed, "[tihe primary gatekeeper at the
door to the federal courts of appeals is the rule that only final judgments
are appealable."96
The final judgment rule has long been a feature of appellate court
function,9 7 and one long-established justification for the current federal
rule is docket control. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the Judiciary
Act of 1789 and the Judiciary Act of 1891, described the rule's history
and justification, including the need to relieve the Supreme Court of the
mounting burdens of increased litigation.9 8 The label "crisis of volume"
does not appear, but

Procedure: Appellate Jurisdiction and the Separate Judgment and Docket Entry
Requirements, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 409 (1996); Scott L. Cagan, Rule 58 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: An Appealing Alternative, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 324 (1992).
94. See, e.g., Marler v. Adonis Health Prod., 997 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1993)(as a court
of limited jurisdiction, court of appeals must determine whether it has jurisdiction before
reaching merits of appeal). But see infra note 111 (citing cases where courts find
jurisdictional question too difficult and simply reach merits of the appeal).
95.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:

CRISIS AND REFORM 72-73 (1985)

(reviewing a sample of 1983 published opinions and finding 88% were appeals from a final
judgment).
96. Nagel, supra note 73, at 200.
97.

15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3906, at 264-

68 (1992) (tracing history of final judgment rule from the writ of error at English common
law, but concluding that history provides "little useful guide for understanding or applying
the requirement today"); Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review ofFinaland Non-Final
Ordersin FloridaCivil Cases-An Overview, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (Summer 1984)
(describing history at English common law and need for final judgment rule because the
trial court and appellate court could not simultaneously review the entire trial court record;
thus, need for a final judgment rule).
98. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891); M. Linda Concannon & Berniece A.
Browne, What Ever Happened to the Right to Appeal?, 57 PLI/CoRp. 511, 515 (1987) ("The
requirement of finality was established in the Judiciary Act of 1789 for the purpose of
conserving judicial resources."). The original rule did not share this purpose. Carleton M.
Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541-44 (1932)
(noting that controlling volume of appeals was not an intent of the original final judgment
rule, which may have begun simply as a part of courts' recordkeeping process).
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it is manifest on the face of (the Judiciary Act], that its primary object
was to facilitate the prompt disposition of cases in the supreme court,
and to relieve it of the enormous overburden of suits and cases
resulting from the rapid growth of the country and the steady increase
of its litigation."
The final judgment rule remains, and few advocate its elimination.' 00
Its benefits include judicial efficiency because some issues a party seeks
to appeal before a final decision may be mooted when the case is finally
determined on its merits.'
The final judgment rule helps to avoid
piecemeal appeals that may threaten the independence of trial judges.'0 2 The rule prevents the potential harassment and cost that a
series of separate appeals from the various individual rulings could
create. 103
But the terse final judgment statute, unlike the certification standards
defined in other appeals, does not list factors for the court to use in
determining what is a final decision. A much-cited working definition
for a final order is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.""° The

99. McLish, 141 U.S. at 665-66.
100. See Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE
L.J. 539 (1932) (arguing to eliminate appeals of right); Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right
to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985) (arguing to eliminate appeals
as of right).

The justification and goals of appellate review are not debated here. See Solimine, supra
note 13, at 1175 (listing values of appeals as correcting factual and legal decisions,
developing law applicable to "all geographically dispersed federal courts," providing the
litigants with review beyond the single trial court judge); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 16-19 (1994)
(appellate courts perform dual functions of error correction and declaration of law).
101. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987). See
generally 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3913, at
462 (1992) ("Although well-established rules of appealability might at times cause an action
to be determined unjustly, slowly, and expensively, they have nonetheless the great virtue
of forestalling the delay, harassment, expense, and duplication that could result from
multiple or ill-timed appeals.").
102. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984) (the rule helps preserve
the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate court interference with the numerous
decisions they must make in the pre-judgment stages of litigation); Parkinson v. April
Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 652 (2nd Cir. 1975) (describing final judgment rule as "important
tool" in regulating trial and appellate court relations). See generally ROBERT J.
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 116 (1987).
103. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
104. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). In criminal cases, section 1291
prohibits appellate review until after conviction and imposition of sentence. Midland
Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989).
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statute and the cases sum up the rule in a few catchwords, but the final
judgment rule's flexibility 5 has long made it a means of achieving
appellate docket control.
The final judgment rule increasingly functions as a case management
method for federal appellate courts. Indeed, independent review and
screening for appellate jurisdictional defects"° is touted as a case
management method that will "save appreciable appellate resources with
a minimal investment. " 10 7 Staff attorneys in the Seventh Circuit, for
example, seek to identify jurisdictional defects-often lack of a final
judgment-and if a defect is perceived, issue an order to the appellant
to state why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 0 8 The Seventh Circuit has estimated that jurisdiction is lacking

105. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) ("[N]o verbal formula yet
devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly
reliable guide for the future.").
106. Appellate courts have no jurisdiction over a nonfinal decision and indeed, are
obligated to raise the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 19 F.3d 155, 156
(4th Cir. 1994})"Neither of the parties has raised or briefed the existence ofjurisdiction...
of this appellate court .... Nevertheless, we are obligated to raise the matter on our own
motion."). Technically, the appellant is obligated under FED. R. APP. P. 28 to state in its
brief the basis for jurisdiction.
A statement of the subject matter and appellate jurisdiction. The statement shall
include: (ii) a statement for the basis of jurisdiction in the court of appeals, with
citation to the applicable statutory provisions and with reference to the relevant
facts to establish such jurisdiction; the statement shall include relevant filing
dates establishing the timeliness of the appeal or petition for review and (a) shall
state that the appeal is from a final order or judgment that disposes of all claims
with respect to all parties or, if not, (b) shall include information establishing that
the court of appeals has jurisdiction on some other basis.
FED. R. APP. P. 28(aX2).
107. Baker, IntramuralReforms, supra note 48, at 1332. See also United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Docketing Statement at 3.
3. Date final judgment or order to be reviewed was filed and entered on district
court docket sheet.
a. Does the judgment or order to be reviewed dispose of all claims by and
against all parties? See FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b).
b. If not, did district court direct entry of judgment in accordance with FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b)? When was this done?
c. If the judgment or order is not a final disposition, is it appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)?
d. If none of the above applies, what is the specific statutory basis for
determining that the judgment or order is appealable?
108. Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1992), appeal after remand, 11 F.3d
729 (1994). The order issued in Barrow stated:
A preliminary review of the short record indicates that the order appealed from
may not be a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ....
Generally, an appeal may not be taken in a civil case until a final judgment is
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"in about a fifth of all appeals" and that the screening process and
jurisdictional orders successfully identify and often eliminate appeals
that lack jurisdiction.'
Such screening procedures can, however,
prolong the appellate process and create contradicting assessments of
finality."0
Recent interpretations of the final judgment rule respond to the crisis
of volume. Although the statute and case law interpreting it appear to
state the final judgment rule rigidly, it has been constantly open to
judicial interpretation in response to the pressures of caseload volume
and scarce judicial resources. Indeed, jurisdictional issues created by the
dilemma of defining what makes an order final have sometimes rendered
the jurisdictional question more difficult than the merits. Thus, some
courts effectively punt by deciding the merits and simply not reaching

entered on the district court's civil docket .... It does not appear that such a
final judgment has been entered. Therefore, this appeal appears to be premature.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that defendants-appellants shall file ... a brief
memorandum stating why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. A motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 42(b)
will satisfy this requirement. Briefing shall be held in abeyance pending further
court order.
The Barrow court explained the people and the process behind the "show jurisdiction"
order.
The order giving defendants the choice between explanation and dismissal was
entered not by the judges but by the legal staff. Like most other appellate courts,
ours attempts to identify jurisdictional problems promptly after an appeal is filed
to save everyone's time in the event that jurisdiction is missing-as it is in about
a fifth of all appeals filed in this court. The staff attorneys examine the short
record that district courts transmit .... A quick review catches many problems
but inevitably overlooks the solutions to some. Thus the role of the order to file
jurisdictional memoranda: the staff identifies what looks to be a problem and asks
the lawyers for their views, giving appellant the option of voluntary dismissal if
counsel cannot find a solution.
Id at 1102-03.
109. Barrow, 977 F.2d at 1102-03. The court stated:
Of the 2,824 appeals this circuit terminated in 1990-91, 158 were dismissed by the
court for want of jurisdiction before the parties exchanged briefs. Another 535
were dismissed by the appellant under FED. R. APP. P. 42. Many of these
dismissals are precipitated by notices of the sort employed in this case. Another
303 cases were dismissed for want of prosecution, sometimes when the appellant
did not respond to the jurisdictional notice .... Still more appeals are dismissed
for want of jurisdiction after briefing; the Administrative Office records these as
terminations "on the merits" and so understates the number of cases with
jurisdictional flaws.
110. See, e.g., Dannenberg,16 F.3d at 1074 n.1, 1076 ("Although a motions panel of this
Court previously denied the Underwriters' motion to dismiss [for lack of appellate
jurisdiction], we have an independent duty to determine whether appellate jurisdiction
exists;" concluding that court lacked appellate jurisdiction).
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the jurisdictional finality issue."' The Judicial Improvements Act of
1990112 recognized that the often "perplexing caselaw on what 'final'
means" may too narrowly define finality"' and empowered the Supreme Court to "define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 1291 ....

"n

Circuit splits over finality issues have long existed and have continued
to multiply. These splits and disputes reflect efforts of trial court judges
to manage their dockets in the face of growing numbers of cases and the
increasing complexity of individual cases. The courts split over the final
nature of consolidated cases, consent judgments, and involuntary
dismissals-all practices used to manage trial court dockets. Thus, case
management practices at the district court level have often collided with
the final judgment rule at the appellate level. Final judgments in
consolidated cases" 5 divided the courts in the 1980s."' The use of

111. See, e.g., In re Villa Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc., 984 F.2d 546, 548 n.2 (et Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 818 (1993) ("Because the case is straightforward, and the party
in whose favor the jurisdictional issue would operate is entitled to prevail on the merits,
we elect to forgo unnecessary work and to bypass the question of appellate jurisdiction.");
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Howard Communications Corp., 980 F.2d 823,829
(1st Cir. 1992) ("[W]e need not resolve the difficult jurisdictional issue ... since the
contempt finding and sanctions were abundantly warranted".); In re DN Assocs., 3 F.3d
512, 515 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We do not reach the question of... standing raised sua sponte
by this court. After all, it is settled that an appellate court, confronted by a difficult
jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional question, may forgo its resolution if the merits of the
appeal are, as here, straightforward and easily resolved in favor of the party or parties to
whose benefit the objection to jurisdiction would redound.").
112. P.L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
113. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. The
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee acknowledged that appellate jurisdiction
under current caselaw "may in some circumstances restrict too sharply the opportunity for
interlocutory review." Id.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1994). "Such rules may define when a ruling of a district
court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title." Id.
115. Consolidated cases are allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).
Under this Rule, district courts can more effectively manage their dockets. "District courts
consolidate actions under a variety of circumstances to avoid duplicative proceedings."
Jacqueline Gerson, The Appealability of PartialJudgments in ConsolidatedCases, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 169, 172 (1990). These circumstances include actions which will require
"identical legal or factual determinations," actions where claims are brought by "similarly
situated plaintiffs or defendants," and where the district courts find the actions "could or
should have been filed as a single action in the first place." Id. at 172-73.
116. Compare FDIC v. Caledonia Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (Ist. Cir. 1988) (partial
judgment always final because consolidated actions retain their separate identity) with
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Intl, Inc., 822 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (decide appealability
on case-by-case basis) and Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.
1987) (partial judgments in consolidated cases require Rule 54(b) certification). See
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consent judgments.. 7 to reach a final appealable order generated

controversy and conflict in the appellate courts."' Appellate courts
also debated the use of inviting the trial court's involuntary dismissal to
reach a final judgment." 9
The judicially created "death knell" doctrine presents further evidence
of finality problems when trial courts must manage complex or large
cases, particularly class actions. The doctrine holds that orders may be
final judgments when they effectively end the lawsuit. 20 The doctrine
evolved from orders denying temporary relief,' denying class certification motions," and orders, which, although not final in themselves,
combined with other events or circumstances to end the action.
Thus, some courts "permitted appeals from orders.., on the theory that
the denial sounded the death knell of the action." 24 Permitting such

generally Gerson, supra note 114.
117. A consent judgment gives district court litigants a valuable process to resolve
disputes. "A consent judgment results from mutual understanding and concerted action
by the parties, as documented in a settlement agreement or stipulation which is consented
to and sanctioned by the court." Robert R. Zitko, The Appealabilityof ConditionalConsent
Judgments, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 241, 242 (1994).
Consent judgments, like the current practice of peripheral claim dismissal, were
motivated by the litigants' desire to resolve the case after a large or major portion of the
claims have been resolved by a court decision: "To avoid the costs associated with
litigating the case to its conclusion, particularly when the partial summary judgment has
adversely decided the most important issues being contested, the party may enter into a
consent judgment, expressly reserving its right to appeal the contested issues." Id. at 243.
118. Compare Hudson K. v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 922 F.2d 1306 (7th
Cir. 1991) (permitting appellate review of a consent judgment which expressly reserved the
right to appeal), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230 (1991) with Amstar Corp. v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 607 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1979) (no appellate review of consent judgment with
or without express reservation of right to appeal), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 924 (1980). See
generallyZitko, supra note 118; Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975); Crick, The Final Judgment as Basis
for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
119. See, e.g., DuBose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171(8th Cir. 1990) ("[The sufferance
of dismissal without prejudice because of failure to prosecute is not to be employed as an
avenue for reaching issues which are not subject to interlocutory appeal as of right."), but
see id. at 172 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dismissal was with
prejudice and appeal should have been permitted).
120. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967).
121. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850
(1962).
122. Eisen, 370 F.2d at 120-21.
123. Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966).
124. 15A WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3912, at 451.
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appeals allowed review of claims that would otherwise go unreviewed,
and, if left in place, would end the action.12
Now discredited in the class certification setting,12 the death knell
doctrine offers some lessons about finality issues. Appellate courts have
learned that speculating about the likely future of a case by examining
the district court record for plaintiff's intent, motivation to litigate, and
individual financial resources is time-consuming, burdensome, and often
futile.'2 7
V.

VOLUNTARY PERIPHERAL CLAIM

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

CREATES A FINAL DECISION
With the limited use of discretionary appeals and the increasing
scrutiny of final judgments, trial court judges and litigants began to use
voluntary dismissal of peripheral claims to achieve a final decision and
gain appellate review-under section 1291. Voluntary claim dismissal is
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).'8 A voluntary

125. See, e.g., Eisen, 370 F.2d at 121 ("Dismissal of the class action in the present case
. will irreparably harm Eisen and all others similarly situated, for ... it will for all
practical purposes terminate the litigation. Where the effect of a district court's order, if
not reviewed, is the death knell of the action, review should be allowed.").
126. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (finding that certification
denial order was not final, appealable judgment under death knell doctrine and noting that
death knell doctrine produced administrative nightmares, favored plaintiffs, and
encouraged appellate court intrusion into trial court processes); King v. Kansas City S.
Indus., 479 F.2d 1259, 1260 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("We decline to adopt and
accordingly reject the so-called 'death knell' theory originally enunciated in Eisen.").
127. For example, appellate courts combed the district court record to determine the
likelihood that the action would end without a class certification. Compare Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (applying death knell
doctrine and granting appellate jurisdiction to an individual plaintiff with a claim under
$1,000) with Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397 (2nd Cir. 1974)
(denying appellate review under death knell doctrine to individual plaintiff with claim of
$7,482). See also Randall J. Turk, Note, Toward a More RationalFinal Judgment Rule:
A Proposal to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1034 (1979)("Perhaps no
exception to the final judgment rule has been as ... difficult to apply as the judicially
created death knell doctrine.").
Courts have retained, however, the concept underlying the death knell doctrine, the idea
that some orders should become final because they "effectively terminate[] the litigation."
See, e.g., McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 478-79 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (granting appeal
where indefinite continuation of prisoner's trial would "make it impossible to produce...
witnesses ...

and ...effectively deprive him of his day in court.").

128. The voluntary dismissal orders at issue in the cases are dismissals sought after
the defendant has filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment. Once these actions
occur, the plaintiff can no longer voluntarily dismiss without leave of the court. Instead,
the plaintiff must seek a court order by filing a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2). See supra note 11 for text of this provision; Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506
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dismissal may be with or without prejudice. Rule 41(a)(2) provides that
"[ulnless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice."" 9
A. Honoringthe Formalitiesof Language: Dismissal With
Prejudice Is Required to Create Finality
The current finality controversy is rooted in the trial courts' often
unexamined practice of designating the dismissal as a dismissal with or
without prejudice, and the appellate courts' acceptance of an appeal,
both without analysis of the designation. Yet the difference between the
two designations- with or without prejudice-is night and day; they
have opposite meanings. This lack of attention to essential designations
may stem in both instances from the sheer number of cases and the
number of claims and parties within each of those cases. With so many
cases and so many claims within each case, the type of disposition
rendered on each claim is difficult to locate at the trial court level and
later within a voluminous appellate record. No appellate screening form
focuses on peripheral claims; the focus is on the adjudicated, central
claim being appealed.
The appellate courts' practices may also reflect suspicion that no
matter which label the trial courts employ, the lower court judges and
litigants may intend to move the case off the docket by wrongly creating
appellate jurisdiction where, in reality, none exists. Therefore, some
appellate courts have leapfrogged over the meaning expressly conveyed
by the designation with or without prejudice to look for the trial court
judges' and parties' intent.
Simply stated, a dismissal without prejudice leaves the party free to
return to press the claim at a future date."s A dismissal with prejudice creates the entirely opposite effect: the plaintiff has agreed "to a
judgment that serves to bar his claims forever." 3 ' The confusion

(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,116 S. Ct. 1710 (1996).
129. FED. R. CV. P. 41(a)(2). Whether to grant a voluntary dismissal under this
provision of the Rule is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994).
130. Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1991)
(dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties in the same position as if the litigation had
never been commenced); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930,93435 (11th Cir. 1987) (dismissal without prejudice allows party to bring an action for the
same claim against the same defendants). See generally 5 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET. AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 41.02[2] (2d ed. 1996).
131. Concha, 62 F.3d at 1493. See also Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc.,
924 F.2d 530,534 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that voluntary dismissal with prejudice has same
effect as judgment on the merits).
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began when some trial and appellate courts failed to analyze the labels
attached to voluntary dismissals of peripheral claims. The labeling of
a voluntary dismissal order as with or without prejudice is, however, not
simply a ministerial detail readily waived or remedied after the fact.1" 2
Nor is the label a matter of form that should be ignored so that an
appellate court can focus on the intent of the lower court's decision; the
choice of designation is the substance. 3 '
The finality of an earlier adjudicated claim should not be created by
a peripheral claim dismissal without prejudice. That practice undermines finality and ignores the meaning of the term without prejudice.
A peripheral claim dismissal without prejudice leaves the party free to
pursue that claim against the same parties. The potential for piecemeal
appeals becomes greater when the peripheral claim dismissal is without
prejudice.'" A peripheral claim, dismissed without prejudice in the
trial court, may be renewed and litigated again after the appellate court
issues a decision on the central claim. A second appeal may arise from
the same parties and the same35 litigation, the very result the final

judgment rule seeks to prevent.1

A peripheral claim dismissal with prejudice, however, forces the
litigant to make difficult choices and to live with the consequences, while
furthering the underlying purposes of the final judgment rule. The
litigant can accept the adverse. ruling on the central claims, take the
time and money to pursue the remaining claims to trial or other
completion, and then appeal. But, if the peripheral or remaining claims

132. See supra note 94.

133. Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995) (where
amount of disability benefits was not reduced to a sum certain, then appellate court could
disregard label of order as final and "analyze the substance of the district court's decision,
not its label or form."); Concha, 62 F.3d at 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We must still consider
whether the Conchas Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal, though labelled a dismissal without
prejudice, should nevertheless be treated as a dismissal with prejudice.").
134. Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at 1077 ("litigants should not be able to avoid the final
judgment rule without fully relinquishing the ability to further litigate unresolved
[peripheral] claims") (emphasis added); Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d
147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[Wlhen a plaintiff voluntarily requests dismissal of her
remaining claims without prejudice in order to appeal from an order that dismisses another

claim with prejudice, we conclude that the order is not 'final' for purposes of § 1291.").
135. See, eg., Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F,2d 1150, 1168 (Adams, J.,

dissenting) (concluding that dismissal without prejudice means plaintiffs retained the cause
of action and disallowing an "end-run" around the finality rule; "if we accept appellants'
rationale, then we also accept the notion that the policies against multiplicity of litigation

and against piecemeal appeals may be avoided at the whim of a plaintiff. He need merely
dismiss portions of his complaint without prejudice, appeal from what had been an
interlocutory order, and refile the dismissed portion as a separate lawsuit.") (quoting
Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1979)).

APPELLATE REVIEW

1997]

1007

are judged to be weaker or ultimately less fruitful, they can be dismissed
with prejudice and sacrificed to pursue an appeal on the claims that are
most central to recovery for the litigant. If the case is going nowhere
after a partial summary judgment or dismissal decision, then dismissal
with prejudice of the peripheral claims efficiently and fairly permits an
appeal that will not beget another later appeal and, thus, undermine the
final judgment rule embodied in section 1291."'6 Voluntary dismissal
with prejudice followed by an appeal of the earlier adjudicated claims
"furthers the goal of judicial economy by permitting a plaintiff to forgo
litigation on the dismissed claims while accepting the risk that if the
appeal is unsuccessful, the litigation will end."" 7 Thus, the practice
promotes judicial economy and preserves, not manipulates, the finality
requirement of section 1291.
Finality for earlier adjudicated claims should be created only through
dismissal with prejudice of peripheral claims. The practice of allowing
dismissals of peripheral claims without prejudice to finalize earlier
adjudicated claims likely evolved from a lack of analysis of peripheral
claim dismissal in the press of cases waiting on the trial court and
appellate court dockets. Often, such appeals are accepted without
For example, the Suanalysis of the peripheral claim dismissal."
preme Court of the United States appeared to accept, without analysis,
a voluntary dismissal of a peripheral claim without prejudice to seek the
appeal of an earlier decision. 39 A closer look at the case, however,
demonstrates that any reliance upon it is misplaced. In National
Broilers Marketing, the Court noted a procedural history including
efforts by the district court litigants "to facilitate the appeal" of a claim
against one set of defendants by withdrawing without prejudice claims
against another set of defendants."40
In the district court, the Government brought an antitrust claim
against the National Broilers Marketing Association (NBMA), claiming
its status rendered it exempt from antitrust liability."" In ruling on
cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found the NBMA
was a farmers cooperative entitled to a limited exemption under the
law. 42 In response to the ruling and "to facilitate the appeal," the

136. Dannenberg,16 F.3d at 1077 n.3 (where claims dismissed with prejudice, plaintiffs
were "not free to relitigate dismissed claims" and thus, there was "no reason to be
concerned about circumvention of the final judgment rule").

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Chappelle, 84 F.3d at 654.
See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
National Broilers Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
Id. at 819-20 n.5.
Id. at 818.

142. Id.
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Government "amended the complaint to limit its allegations of conspiracy to the members of the NBMA."143 The amendment "was done
without any prejudice to any later renewal of allegations abandoned by
the amendment," and the trial court then "dismissed the amended
complaint with prejudice."1'"
By accepting this practice, the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court
permitted the Government to test the decision's validity as to NBMA
members through appeal, while allowing it the chance to pursue related
claims against nonmember defendants after the appellate decision. The
dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice presented a final
order. The appellate courts focused on the dismissal with prejudice of
the amended complaint, a plainly appealable order, and did not consider
closely the peripheral claim against nonmembers, a claim dismissed
without prejudice and amenable to later reinstatement.
The decision in National BroilersMarketing reveals that in screening
appeals, the primary finality focus is often on the central claim being
appealed-the summary judgment: decision, not. the peripheral claim
dismissal. Only more recently have appellate courts come to focus on
the nature of the peripheral claims dismissal. The decision in National
BroilersMarketing, however, does not support use of voluntary dismissal
of peripheral claims without prejudice. The peripheral claim in National
Broilers Marketing concerned a separate and distinct set of defendants
and, thus, fell within rule 54(b). The claim could readily be viewed as
final and appealable under that rule.
The current voluntary dismissal practice of some courts, however,
involves dismissal without prejudice of peripheral claims involving the
same parties as the already adjudicated central claim on appeal. The
result of the NationalBroilersMarketing decision would not undermine
the final judgment rule, nor create the potential for repeated appeals.
The result of the current practice of voluntary dismissal without
prejudice allows expressly for reinstatement and repeated or piecemeal
appeals generated by the same litigation below.
B. Honoring the Formalitiesof Language Eliminates An Unnecessary
and Wasteful Search for Intent
Appellate jurisdiction based on an intent requirement undermines
finality and certainty in the appellate process. An intent requirement
has been manufactured by some appellate courts, partly out of concern
that the district court judge and litigants, pressed by the desire for
volume and docket control, may manipulate the appellate process to gain
143, Id. at 819-20 n.5.
144. Id.
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a quick, but unwarranted, early review. As a result of a wasteful focus
on intent, terms with opposite meanings-with prejudice and without
prejudice-have become interchangeable and been rendered meaningless
in the appellate process.
The distinction between dismissal with and without prejudice is
crucial. Ignoring labels and searching for intent replaces district court
certainty with uncertainty and speculation. Peripheral claims must be
dismissed with prejudice to preserve the final judgment rule. When
appellate courts ignore or disregard the label assigned to the dismissal
and simply search the record for intent as the real indicia of finality, the
appellate process breaks down. Appellate jurisdiction is denied when
intent is present and is granted when it is absent.
Evidence suggests that the appellate courts' search of trial court
records for intent comes, in part, from the appellate courts' mistrust of
the district courts' desire to get cases off their dockets and onto the
appellate courts' dockets. Rather than relying upon the designation
given in the dismissal orders, the appellate courts search for the district
courts' bad intent to manufacture appellate jurisdiction. 4 ' The search
for bad intent stems from broader appellate court concern over party
independence and trial court responses to overloaded dockets.," For
example, in analyzing section 1291 finality within the context of a
district court judge's dismissal of a suit with leave to reinstate, the
Seventh Circuit considered the district court judge's motives for such a
dismissal. 47 The appellate court viewed the practice as one wrongly
motivated by the trial court judge's desire to improve his docketload
statistics'48 by lowering the number of pending cases:
One difference between a dismissal with leave to reinstate and a
continuance with dismissal in store if a step is not taken is that the
immediate dismissal makes the district court's statistics look better.

145. See, e.g., Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1433.
146. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text discussing crisis of volume and case

management techniques.
147. Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 1163. The docketload statistics the appellate court refers to are required
by 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (1993), which states as follows:
(a) The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, that discloses for each

judicial officer- (1) the number of motions that have been pending for more than
six months and the name of each case in which such motion has been pending;

(2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more than six months
and the name of each case in which such trials are under submission; and (3) the
number and names of cases that have not been terminated within three years
after filing.
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Never should a court jeopardize a litigant's rights for the purpose of
burnishing its own reputation. 49
Thus, the appellate 'panel openly viewed finality as vulnerable
to
50
manipulation by trial court judges for docket control purposes.
The search for intent may also be a search for good intent. For
example, good intent may be found where, although the parties have
dismissed without prejudice and preserved the right to a later appeal on
the peripheral claims, the appellate court does not believe they really
intend to bring such an appeal and create a problem with repeated
appeals of the same case.'
Thus, although the dismissal without
prejudice undermines finality principles, the court trusts the good intent
of the parties not to bring another appeal in the future.
The appellate courts' willingness to ignore labels and search for intent
has resulted in several distinct, but related, problems. First, some
courts permit peripheral claim dismissal without prejudice to finalize an
earlier order, satisfied by the parties' good intent not to relitigate after
the appeal. Second, -some courts recognize dismissal without prejudice
will permit later appeals and, therefore, deny appellate jurisdiction, but
still search the record for good or bad intent. Third, a few courts have
denied jurisdiction even when the claims are dismissed with prejudice,
again relying on evidence of the parties' intent.
In the first category of appeals, peripheral claims are dismissed
without prejudice, but the appellate courts find finality. The designation
leaves parties free to relitigate, creating the potential for piecemeal
review. Rather than deny the appeal for lack of finality, the appellate
courts ignore the dismissal designation. The courts accept the appeal,
relying on the perceived good intent of parties not to exercise the right
to litigate the dismissal affords them." 2 Thus, the appellate courts

149.

Otis, 29 F.3d at 1163.

150. Id. The concurrence in Otis, however, defends the practice and the district court
judge's conduct, while noting the docket congestion at the trial court level.
In the current judicial climate, where congressionally-imposed time constraints on
the civil docket compete with the Speedy Trial Act restrictions of the criminal
docket, we should not be so quick to condemn a practice [dismissal with leave to
reinstate] that has proved useful to our district court colleagues simply because
it may, in a few isolated instances, create jurisdictional questions on appeal.
Given the degree of docket congestion in the Northern District of Illinois, I think
it incumbent upon us, as a responsive reviewing court, to provide our colleagues
with all reasonable means of efficiently and intelligently managing their case
loads.
Id. at 1172-1173 (Bouner & Cadahy, J.J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Kaufman, 985 F.2d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1993); Hicks v.
NLO, Inc., 825 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987).
152. Kaufman, 985 F.2d at 891.
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looked past the dismissal of a peripheral claim without prejudice, which
allowed future piecemeal appeals, to search the record to speculate or
determine the party's intent to actually exercise its right to a later
appeal: "There is no evidence here that the parties and the district
judge were attempting deliberately.., to 'create' appellate jurisdiction.
Although the government is free to seek a new indictment on the
dismissed counts, there is nothing to indicate its intention to do so."'
Because the party exhibited no bad intent to manipulate the appellate
process or to press the claims anew after appeal, the court deemed the
dismissal of peripheral claims without prejudice as making the earlier
adjudicated claim final.M
Within this same category of appeals, good intent may also be implied
when a peripheral claim dismissal without prejudice is openly acknowledged by the district court judge." 5 Apparently, the district court
judge's knowledge of the dismissal order's terms is evidence the party
did not try to deceive the trial court judge or manipulate the appellate
process:
Where a court has entered judgment against a plaintiff in a case
involving more than one claim and the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses
the claim or claims, which made the judgment non-appealable and the
dismissal [without prejudice] is brought to the attention of the district
court, this Court will not penalize the plaintiff by dismissing his or her
appeal. 16
In this first category of appeals, the court should simply accept the
party's expressed intent, which is a dismissal without prejudice,
preserving the right to pursue a later appeal. Because of the possibility
that piecemeal appeals will be created by a dismissal of peripheral
claims without prejudice, the court should deny the appeal. The court's
search for indicia of future conduct and motivation to determine if the
party really will pursue the peripheral claims it has preserved and cause
piecemeal appeals is time-consuming and entirely unnecessary. Parties
should be held to the type of dismissal chosen.' 57 A dismissal without

153. Id.

154. Id.
155. Hicks, 825 F.2d at 120 (implying good intent and allowing appeal where district

court had knowledge of dismissal without prejudice).

156. Id.
157. Even when statute of limitations appears to have run on claim dismissed without
prejudice, the wiser choice is to honor the label. See Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 22
n.6 (I1th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that appellate jurisdiction exists because statute
of limitations on the claims dismissed without prejudice have run and thus they cannot be
relitigated, "[s]tatute of limitations matters often need much thought. And, an appellate
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prejudice leaves the litigants to renew those claims. Allowing an appeal
in these instances frustrates the final judgment rule and complicates
what should be a straightforward process.
In a second category of appeals, the peripheral claims are dismissed
without prejudice, and the appeals are dismissed, not only because
dismissal without prejudice could generate later appeals and undermine
finality, but in addition, because of the party's bad intent to manipulate
appellate jurisdiction. For example, rather than simply accept the
district court's dismissal without prejudice and find no appellate
jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit examined the record and found a bad
intent to manipulate the appellate process." In describing the intent
of a party who dismissed a counterclaim without prejudice, the court
concluded: "It was clearly not the intention of the defendants to
abandon their counterclaim which was not otherwise in jeopardy.""5 9
Where the dismissal is without prejudice, the court should accept the
label and look no further for intent. It is not productive. to criticize
parties for intending to exercise in the future a right they preserved by
dismissing without prejudice. Nor is it conducive to maintaining good
relations between two courts who share a common enemy-an expanding
docket of cases.
In the third category of appeals, the peripheral claims are dismissed
with prejudice, precluding future appeals of those claims, but the court
denies appellate jurisdiction over the remaining claims because of the
party's bad intent. A peripheral claim dismissed with prejudice
indicates that the parties have given up the claim completely. One
appellate court, however, held the decision was not final despite that
label."6 Although it dismissed the claim with prejudice, the court
feared that even this dismissal allowed for the claim's "possible
resuscitation."'
The court's majority glanced at intent, but stated
that intent did not influence its decision: "[W]e are not disposed to
fashion a rule that would depend upon nice calculations as to a

court, such as this one, is poorly situated to litigate and to decide, in the first instance,
whether a statute of limitation has run to the point of barring an action; we cannot, for
example, rule out the possible existence of tolling events which would not appear on the
record on appeal."); Contra Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1155 (finding appellate jurisdiction and
concluding dismissal, without prejudice rendered earlier adjudication final where two-year
statute of limitations had run at the time and thus "the dismissal which was nominally

without prejudice, was for our purposes, a final dismissal") (citing Carr v. Grace, 516 F.2d
502 (5th Cir. 1975)).

158. Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1433.
159. Id.
160. DuBose v. Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1990).

161. Id.
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plaintiff's motives,
or lack thereof, for permitting a Rule 41(b) dismissal
16 2
to be entered."

The dissent quite correctly accepted the with prejudice designation and
found the dismissal rendered the earlier decision final and appealable." But the dissent did not stop at the designation and chose to
engage in an additional exercise-the search for intent: "I see no
suggestion in this record that DuBose deliberately manipulated the
system so as to obtain an early review of decisions that would otherwise
not have been appealable.""'
In these appeals, the party has dismissed the peripheral claims with
prejudice, giving up the right to pursue them at a later date. This
makes final the earlier adjudicated claims and allows for appellate
review. The search for intent wastes time by answering a question
which has already been answered: Will the litigants create a series of
future appeals by virtue of this dismissal? The answer is no-the
dismissal has been entered with prejudice; thus, the claim cannot be
resuscitated.
The practice of ignoring peripheral claim dismissal orders and
searching the trial court record for intent is wasteful and confusing.
Appellate jurisdiction should not depend upon the "nice calculations" of
intent. In similar settings, courts have recognized that appellate
jurisdiction should not turn upon the district court's purpose or intent,
6
but rather should turn upon the formal content of the judgment.1 5
The search for intent under the death knell doctrine has proven nearly
impossible to apply. Like the current search for intent, the death knell
doctrine involved speculation about a party's future conduct and motives.
Thus, courts found the doctrine created "administrative nightmares" and
encouraged appellate court intrusion into the details of the trial court's
processes."~
In addition to wasting scarce appellate judicial resources, the search
for intent and the contradictory decisions it has engendered have left
district court litigants and judges with a defined path to an appeal under
section 1291. Judges and litigants need to, but cannot, rely upon the
meaning of the voluntary dismissal orders entered to communicate to the
appellate courts. They "need objective [known] ... criteria to guide their

162. Id.
163. Id. at 171-72 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 172.

165. Glidden, 808 F.2d at 624 (finding district court judge's "intent" irrelevant in the
Rule 54(b) certification setting).
166. See supra notes 120-27.
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decisions,"'67 but instead have received subjective and speculative
searches of the record and a disregard for the formalities of dismissal
orders."'
The frustration and uncertainty inherent in the appellate court's
search for intent are exemplified in a recent district court decision,
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co."6 9 In that case, a district court
dismissal order was assigned its opposite meaning based upon the
district court's search for and discovery of earlier wrongful intent to
manufacture finality by dismissing a peripheral claim. The unique
aspect of this district court's search for intent, however, is that it
occurred after the party's appeal and after the appellate court's opinion
had already issued.
In Desnick, plaintiffs dismissed a peripheral claim without prejudice
and then appealed the adjudicated central claims. Upon returning to
the district court after their appeal, plaintiffs were denied reinstatement
of a claim they had dismissed without prejudice, unless they could prove
that they intended to dismiss it with prejudice, but later changed their
minds.
The case fits a familiar profile of an action in which voluntary
dismissal with prejudice of the peripheral claims would efficiently
resolve the litigation. The dismissal, however, was without prejudice.
The gist of the claims had been adjudicated: six counts of plaintiffs'
seven-count complaint were dismissed, leaving only Count VI, a breach
of contract claim. 7 ' After the court dismissed Counts I though V and
Count VII, plaintiffs filed a notice of dismissal of Count VI without
prejudice, and the "Court dismissed Count VI without prejudice on May
31, 1994. " 171 Although the peripheral claim dismissal was without
prejudice and thus undermined finality, the Seventh Circuit accepted the
appeal without analysis and without expressing any concern that
plaintiffs were free to revive Count VI. Thus, the appellate court
disregarded the potential for repeated appeals. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissals of Counts I, II, III, IV, and V, but reversed and
remanded on Count VII, the defamation claim.'72

167. Glidden, 808 F.2d at 624.
168. Id.

169. FED. R. SERV. 3d (Callaghan) 958 (1995).
170, Id. (The seven-count complaint originally included: Count I action for trespass;

Count II invasion of privacy; Count III federal wiretapping violations; Count IVWisconsin's
wiretapping statute violations; Count V fraud; Count VI breach of contract; and Count VII
defamation).

171. Id. at 958.
172. Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The parties returned to district court, and, not surprisingly, plaintiffs
moved to reinstate Count VI, the count previously dismissed without
prejudice. As plaintiffs succinctly stated the matter, "the phrase
'without prejudice' means precisely that an action may be reinstated
.173 The district court, however, was not satisfied with the label,
nor with the Seventh Circuit's acceptance of the appeal as a section 1291
appeal from a final decision. The district court retroactively searched for
and found the plaintiffs wrongly intended to manufacture a final
judgment. This wrongful intent was the basis for disallowing reinstatement after appeal of a claim dismissed without prejudice. Failing to find
any direct evidence "indicating efforts to create finality," the court
required plaintiffs to somehow prove that their dismissal without
prejudice was really intended to be precisely the opposite-a dismissal
with prejudice that would permanently end the claim. 74 Failing proof
of this wholly contradictory intent, the court denied the motion to
reinstate:
Without any showing from plaintiffs that the voluntary dismissal of
Count VI was intended to be a permanent dismissal and that the
present effort to refile the claim in federal court is the product of a
recent change of heart, the court concludes it cannot grant Plaintiffs'
motion without sanctioning piecemeal appeals and undermining
finality."
The results of the decision in Desnick, a party forfeiting a claim it
expressly preserved, eloquently argues for finding intent in the terms of
dismissal the parties choose to employ and nowhere else. Plaintiffs
explicitly signaled their future intent to reinstate the count when they
dismissed it without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit accepted the appeal,
apparently willing to take the appeal in ignorance of, or in spite of, the
language of the dismissal order on Count VI. The district court
conditioned reinstatement on plaintiffs' ability to show they somehow,
in their hearts and minds, had meant to dismiss Count VI with prejudice
when, in reality, they employed the opposite label, without prejudice.
The district court examined intent retroactively, requiring plaintiffs to
prove their previous conduct was not an attempt to wrongfully gain
appellate review when, in fact, they had already gained appellate review.
Failing such proof, plaintiffs lost Count VI, a claim they sought to
preserve by dismissing without prejudice.

173. Desnick, 31 FED. R. SERV. 3d at 959.
174. Id. at 960.
175. Id.
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Appellate courts have also manufactured appellate jurisdiction by
disregarding labels, sensing the parties' intent, and prescribing a route
to an appeal. Their prescriptions for jurisdiction share the same
motivation as the district court judges and litigants who manufacture a
final appeal: the recommended course of action will promote judicial
economies of time and expense in the face of a large docket. For
example, one appellate court suggested to litigants seeking an appeal
that to create appellate jurisdiction, they needed to return to the district
prejudice the peripheral claims or to obtain a rule
court to dismiss with
176
54(b) certification.

The appellate courts also contribute to the finality problem, rather
than curing it, because they fail to recognize the materiality of dismissal
labels and thus fail to direct the litigants how to dismiss those
claims-with or without prejudice-as if the designation were of no
significance. In response to a party's first effort to appeal, the court
offered this solution to appealability: "If counts three and four of the
indictment are dismissed upon the government's motion, and if the
defendant again files a notice of appeal, then in the interest of judicial
economy the same panel will decide the appeal on the same briefs,
without further oral argument." 7 ' Unfortunately, the party returned
to the district court, dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice,
them open to later reinstatement, and returned to the appellate
leaving
178
court.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, despite the dismissal without
prejudice, for two reasons. First, the court ignored the label because it
did not think the party would really exercise its right to reinstate. 79
Second, the appellate court concluded that because the litigants'
dismissal with prejudice "was in response to our suggestion, it can be
distinguished from ... [an] attempt to bypass, rather-than follow, the
rules.""s Thus, appellate courts have contributed to the confusion in
the appellate process by ignoring dismissal labels and through misdirections that fail to specify dismissal labels to litigants hoping to enter the
appellate process. There is no principled distinction between the busy
district court judge and the parties who determine how best to proceed
with remaining peripheral claims after an earlier adjudication and the
176. Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at 1078 ("If, upon return to the district court, the plaintiffs
dismiss their remaining § 11 claim with prejudice or procure Rule 54(b) certification and

then file a timely appeal,... 'all papers filed in this appeal will be transferred to the new
appeal and the case will be assigned to this panel.'").
177. United States v. Kaufman, 951 F.2d 793, 796 (7th Cir. 1992).

178. Kaufman, 985 F.2d at 887.
179. Id. at 891.

180. Id.
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appellate court judge who offers litigants a route to finality and the
chance to have the same panel hear the case on later appeal now that
the record is familiar.

VI.

PERIPHERAL CLAIMS: CURRENT AND PROPOSED PRACTICES

The practice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice of peripheral claims
can and should be used to finalize earlier adjudicated claims in litigation
that has grown larger and more protracted in recent years. Appellate
courts cannot accept this practice, however, unless its origin in the trial
courts and its appealability are made clear to the appellate courts.
Litigants have the responsibility to obtain dismissal orders of peripheral
claims that state they are dismissed with prejudice and to account for
the resolution of all pieces of the district court litigation.
At the trial court, judges and litigants may too often rush past the
language of the voluntary dismissal order to get an appeal underway or
to settle an old and tortured case and get it off the current docket. The
phrasing of rule 42 simply adds to the problem of labels. Because a
dismissal under the rule is without prejudice "[uinless otherwise
specified," the consequences of a dismissal without prejudice are not put
in words plainly before the judge or the litigants in the text of the order
itself.181 The order is signed, and the significance of the type of
dismissal remains silent, certainly not the subject of an opinion or other
discussion at the trial court level.
Some formalities of language are simply that--empty forms and
routine words that can be set aside in a search for the substance of an
issue or situation. 8 2 However, the effect upon finality of a dismissal
order with or without prejudice is not an empty form that either the trial
or appellate couit can ignore. Rather, the label is like a material
condition or term in a contract between two parties: that term cannot
be ignored, rendered meaningless, or allowed to assume an opposite
meaning without destroying the relationship between the two parties."s
A better voluntary dismissal practice, by individual judge or local rule,
is to state both designations in the dismissal order itself-without

181. See supra note 10 for text of the Rule.
182. Willits v. Yellow Cab Co., 214 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1954) (in construing the
grounds for an objection under Rule of Criminal Procedure, the goal is to apprise the judge
of the objection and the litigant is not required to adhere to "formalities of language and
style.).
183. In re ABC-Federal Oil & Burner, Co., 290 F.2d 886, 889 (3rd Cir. 1961) ("These
disputed terms were not mere formalities or routine language, but material conditions in
a specialized contract.").
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prejudice or with prejudice-so that the docket entry and any other
paper before the trial or appellate court would be clear beyond any
doubt. Formal language in the order, rather than intent, would be the
basis for analysis. Intent would not be based upon whether the district
court judge knew of the type of dismissal order requested"s or whether
the litigants were hoping the judge would not notice the nature of the
dismissal order."8 5
Appellate courts already employ well-developed screening procedures
for jurisdictional defects. The current procedures suffer from tunnel
vision by focusing nearly exclusively on the "order being appealed from"
and its status as final or nonfinal.M The court examines the central
claim being appealed and searches for finality evidenced through section
1291, section 1292(b), rule 54(b), or some other means by which the
central, adjudicated claim has become appealable and ripe for review.
The analysis of the central claim on appeal is made difficult because of
the number of cases, the large, complex cases with multiple claims
brought by multiple parties, and the length of the case's history below.
Trial court dockets with dozens of pages and hundreds of entries are not
unusual.
As a result of the problems of volume and size in cases being appealed,
appellate courts have not screened or analyzed peripheral claim
dismissals consistently for their status as terminated with prejudice or
open to reinstatement through dismissal without prejudice. 187 Because
of the large and complex nature of the cases coming in, appellate courts
need a better method of accounting for all claims within cases. Such
accounting has already taken place, at least partially, when the district
courts and litigants use voluntary peripheral claim dismissal to finalize
earlier adjudicated claims. After a dismissal or summary judgment on
some of the central claims changes the tenor of litigation involving
multiple parties and many claims,'8 the parties sort out the impor-

184. Hicks, 825 F.2d at 120.
185. Kaufman, 985 F.2d at 891.
186. See supra notes 109-11. See also U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, App.
IV. App. of Forms, at 2 (including questions regarding final nature of "order or judgment
appealed from a final decision on the merits," referencing Rule 54(b), collateral or

interlocutory appeal, related cases, but not questioning status of other claims in the
litigation).
187. See, e.g., Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995)

(appellate court accepted without any comment or analysis on the dismissal without
prejudice of peripheral claims and rendered decision on the merits).
188. See supra note 15; Chapele, 84 F.3d at 653 (plaintiff alleges various causes of
action under federal, New York, and California law); Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d at 2122 (Federal Tort Claim action with multiple counts, including negligent procurement and
service of an arrest warrant, assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction
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tance of the claim." The process of discovery and pretrial litigation
motions may have made litigating the central claims costly and timeconsuming as it has the the prospect of litigating the remaining
peripheral claims."9 The result of this sorting out process may be a
voluntary dismissal with prejudice of peripheral claims that finalizes the
earlier adjudicated claim.
Current appellate screening practices are already well in place 9 '
and focused on the central claims on appeal. These screening processes,
however, need a broader scope to include the resolution of the peripheral
claims in the process. The district court litigants have already
determined the status of all the claims, central and peripheral. They
examined the status of these claims and then chose to finalize the
central one or ones by voluntarily dismissing with prejudice the
peripheral claims. This information needs to be conveyed quickly and
completely to the appellate court screening committee or panel.
The appellate screening process for the information might take the
form of a chart or formalized scorecard, with elements similar to the
information typically sought in a trial court's pretrial order forms. Thus,
a court's docketing statement or equivalent document would include a
scorecard indicating: (i) each count or claim, separating claims against
different defendants, (ii) the count's current status and if voluntarily

of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and a Bivens action); Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at
1073-74 (class action securities litigation against group of auditors and underwriters);
Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1153 (combining four related cases, named defendants filed crossclaims and impleaded a number of third party defendants).
189. See, e.g., Chappele,84 F.3d at 652 (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of claims against both
defendants under New York law: sex discrimination, assault, intentional infliction of
emotional distress; followed by voluntary dismissal without prejudice of remaining claims);
Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at 1074 (granting summary judgment for all underwriters on all
claims and all auditors on all but one claim; followed by voluntary dismissal without
prejudice of single remaining claim); Cook, 974 F.2d at 148 (court dismissed "outrageous
conduct" claim as preempted by federal law; plaintiff voluntarily dismissed remaining
claims without prejudice); ChryslerMotors Corp., 939 F.2d at 540 (court granted partial
summary judgment on counterclaims, including claim for punitive damages; followed by
dismissal without prejudice of remaining claims); Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1154 (granting
summary judgment on to each individual defendant; followed by voluntary dismissal of
remaining claims); Studstill, 806 F.2d at 1008 (granting summary judgment on Counts II
and III; followed by voluntary dismissal of Count I).
190. See supra note 13; Horwitz, 957 F.2d at 1432 (describing second amended
complaint of 118 pages; fifteen depositions with "thousands" of documents; a summary
judgment motion "supported by four substantial volumes of evidence" and observing that
"fuinfortunately this controversy has grown old in the system and not aged well").
191. John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit'sExperience in the
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859 (summarizing each
circuit's screening procedures, including screening for jurisdictional defect).
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dismissed, an indication of dismissal with prejudice or without prejudice,
and (iii) a reference to the proper docket sheet entry for each order cited
in the document."9 The status of each count or claim would include
cross-claims, counterclaims, defenses, or related claims that could affect
finality of the central claim.
Such a chart, or grid screening form, would permit the appellate court
screening committee or panel to review not only the status of the claim
being appealed, but also the status of the dismissed peripheral claims.
Voluntary dismissal with prejudice should be an accepted route to an
appeal because it promotes judicial efficiency and preserves finality as
well. Currently, such a route is difficult to recognize and accept because
it is achieved in steps that are hard to locate in the record. Appellate
courts cannot skim a docketing statement or other materials and readily
spot this route to finality. It is much easier to recognize a rule 54(b) or
section 1292(b) certification than it is to search through pages of entries
to find partial summary judgment orders, voluntary dismissal orders,
and then ascertain that all claims against all parties are fully resolved.
The grid, or chart of claims, will give this route to appeal a clear profile
for judges and appellate staff to recognize when determining proper
appellate jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The on-going conflict within and among the circuits as to whether a
voluntary dismissal is made with or without prejudice and whether such
a dismissal finalizes earlier decisions has needlessly plagued district and
appellate courts. The lack of precision in use of language at both levels
has cost circuit and district courts considerable time and trouble. The
language issue has been caused by growing mistrust, fear of manipulation, and bad motives between the courts brought on by the sheer
number of cases passing through the federal court system.
A return to the formalities of language will serve the efficiency of the
judicial system and the final judgment rule. A dismissal without
prejudice cannot finalize an earlier adjudication because by definition
the claim dismissed without prejudice can be renewed, and the case may
return for a second trip to the appellate court. A dismissal with
prejudice, on the other hand, bars the claim forever; a future second
appeal will not be heard. Such a dismissal should be permitted to

192. For example, the pretrial order form for the Northern District of Illinois requires
the title of the count or claims: "this is an action for [insert nature of action, e.g., breach
of contract,personalinjury]," an indication of "waivers of any claims or defenses that have

been abandoned by any party." Northern District of Illinois Local Rules 123, 125 (amd.
through 3/1/96).
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finalize an earlier adjudication because it is an effective, valid means of
settling a case and seeking a single appeal.
Honoring the formalities of language will eliminate any need to search
for good intent not to refile a claim or for bad intent to manipulate the
appellate process. Any and all intent is communicated through the
order's designation, rather than speculating on the party's likely future
conduct.
The pace of litigation is not likely to slacken any time soon. Both trial
and appellate courts must develop more precise methods for screening
appellate jurisdictional defects that arise, not in the claim being
appealed, but in the status of the peripheral claims. Grids or other
forms of reporting the status of claims in large, complex cases will help
keep track of the details. The screening chart will make visible the
twists and turns of increasingly complex, large-scale litigation and
identify the claims remaining, if any, in the district court litigation.
Such a return to the formalities of language is becoming more imperative as the press of litigation continues in this decade.

